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CHATTEL MORTGAGES ON AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
The question of the validity and effect of attempts to mortgage
after-acquired property is one which has caused much difficulty and
diversity of opinion among the several states. Under the common law,
whose rule the Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted, there could be
no valid mortgage of property which was not in existence at the date
of the mortgage, or of property which did not at least potentially
belong to the mortgagor as an incident of property then in existence
and belonging to him.' That is, where creditors of or innocent purchasers from the mortgagor were involved, only that property which
existed when the mortgage was executed would be burdened with the
lien of the mortgage.
The courts in a majority of the states recognized what they considered an injustice in this rule, and have held that the mortgage acted
as an executory agreement attaching to the property when acquired,
although it was ineffective to pass any title to such property, and
enforced the agreement in equity.2 But neither the courts of Wisconsin
or of Massachusetts will enforce the after-acquired clause, even in
equity. 3
In Chynoweth v. Tenney the court ruled that an estoppel against
the mortgagor must fail, since "An estoppel prohibits one from setting
up the truth against some act or statement of his own, upon which
another has acted in such a manner that he will be injured if the truth
is afterwards allowed to be shown," but where we have an afteracquired clause, it appears on the face that the grantor has no title,
"and the grantee is bound to know that, in law, the conveyance is
inoperative."'
But in no case does the mere attempt to include such property in the
mortgage render it wholly void. In fact, if the mortgagor, after he
acquires the property, by some affirmative act, such as actually delivering the property over to the mortgagee,3 or by executing and de"Comstock v. Scales, 7 Wis 138 (1858) " . . . a chattel mortgage can only
operate upon property in actual existence at the time of execution . . . " Case

v. Fish, 58 Wis. 56, 15 N.W. 808 (1883); Merchants' & Mechanics' Savings
Bank v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis. 601, 55 N.W. 108 (1893); Taylor v. Barton Child
Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117 N.E. 43 (1917).
2 Borden v. Croak, 131 111. 68, 22 N.E. 793, 19 Am. St. Rep. 23 (1889). These
courts usually apply the doctrine that "Equity considers as done that which
ought to be done."
3 Chynoweth v. Tenney, 10 Wis. 341 (1860); Kohler Imp. Co. v. Preder, 217
Wis. 641, 259 N.W. 833 (1935) "In either a sale or a chattel mortgage of
future goods the grantee acquires no title, and if the grantor refuses to
deliver when the same come into existence, the grantee cannot enforce the
same in equity." Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 207, 11 N.E. 83 (1887).
'Chynoweth v. Tenney, 10 Wis. 341 (1860).

6 Ibid.
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livering a deed of surrender of the property ratifies the mortgage,
it will be binding between the parties. To be effective as against creditors and purchasers, there must be an actual transfer of the possession
to the mortgagee, either by a voluntary delivery or by an exercise of
the right to possession.7 It is clear, however, that if there has been
no such ratification or actual surrender of the property after acquisition, the after-acquired clause will be considered a mere license, uncoupled with an interest, and revocable at the will of the mortgagor."
The problem as to the effect of the after-acquired clause most frequently arises where there is an attempt to mortgage future crops.
Crops which must be sown annually are personalty and do not pass
with the land, hence they can be the subject of a valid chattel mortgage. Nevertheless, in Wisconsin, only such crops may be mortgaged
as are up, out of the ground, and have the appearance of a growing
crop.'" In this respect, the Wisconsin Supreme Court holds contra to
the general rule, under which crops to be grown in the future may,
under certain conditions, be mortgaged." But the law of each state
must be closely studied, inasmuch as there are wide divergences of
opinion as to when the mortgage takes effect, the rights of purchasers,
of creditors, etc.
For purposes of convenience, the cases may be classified into those
involving landowner and creditor, landowner and tenant, and landowner and cropper. As a rule, a creditor of a landowner cannot secure
a lien on the future crops because of the principle invalidating mortgages on after-acquired property. But Lanyon v. Woodward" demonstrates an interesting exception, under the doctrine of joint adventure.
Here the landowner had purchased seed from the creditor, under a contract by which the creditor was to remain the owner of the seed and
crop. The landowner agreed to return a certain number of bushels of
grain from the crop and to sell the entire crop to the creditor at a
determinable price. Although this agreement had the effect of securing
a lien on future crops, the court construed it as a "joint adventure,
6 Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Commercial Bank, 11 Wis. 215 (1860).
7Merchants' & Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Lovejoy, supra note 1. Lamson v.
Moffat, 61 Wis. 153, 21 N.W. 62 (1884); Single v. Phelps, 20 Wis. 419 (1866).
8 Kohler Imp. Co. v. Preder, 217 Wis. 641, 259 N.W. 833 (1935). In this case
the court went on to say that the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act (Wis.
Stat. (1937) § 121.05) authorizing contracts to sell goods not in existence or
not acquired, have no application to chattel mortgages.
9Simanek v. Nemetz, 120 Wis. 42, 97 N.W. 508 (1903).
"' Comstock v. Scales, 7 Wis. 138 (1858). In Hill v. Merriman, 72 Wis 483, 40
N.W. 399 (1888), it was held that a chattel mortgage upon a crop of grain
which was not yet sown, or at least was not in existence when the mortgage
was given, is inoperative.
" Weyrauch v. Johnson, 203 Iowa 1380, 208 N.W. 706 (1926) ; In re Miller, 244
Mich. 302, 221 N.W. 146 (1928) ; Mocassin State Bank v. Waldron, 81 Mont.
2 579, 264 Pac. 940 (1928).
1 Lanyon v. Woodward, 55 Wis. 652, 13 N.W. 863 (1882).
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the raising of flax-seed," and enforced it against a holder of a subsequent chattel mortgage on the same crop, who had notice of the
prior contract.
In arrangements between the landlord and tenant, where the landlord reserves a lien on future crops to secure rents, the court has said
it is not to be construed as a chattel mortgage, but rather as a valid
and binding contract between the parties." In Kohler Improvement Co.
v. Preder,4 it was held that "There is a very clear distinction between
the so-called landlord and tenant cases in which there is a reservation
of the title (to the crops) in the lessor for the purpose of securing the
rent to become due under the lease, and the line of cases involving the
validity of chattel mortgages upon crops not in actual existence." But
even in such case, the landlord may be estopped as against a bona fide
purchaser.'- In no case may a person who is a mere cropper, and who
therefore has no interest in or title to the land validly mortgage the
crop.",
At common law, a mortgagee is vested with a defeasible title to the
mortgaged property. Therefore, under the rule that the incident follows the principal, it has been held in the common law states, of which
Wisconsin is one, that there may be a valid chattel mortgage covering
5
the increase of livestock.'1 In Funk v. Paul,'
the leading Wisconsin"
case on this point, it was decided that if the mortgage by express terms
does cover the increase, as between the parties, it remains a lien upon
such increase until the mortgage is discharged. But in respect to subsequent purchasers, the mortgage does not cover after the nurture period
Hill v. Merriman, 72 Wis. 483, 40 N.W. 399 (1888).
14 Kohler Imp. Co. v. Preder, 217 Wis. 641, 259 N.W. 833 (1935). In Layng v.
Stout, 155 Wis. 553, 145 N.W. 227 (1914) the court undertook to explain the
apparent inconsistency between the rule here set forth and the rule that crops
are personalty (Cf supra note 9) thus: "It is true that, as between landlord
and tenant, in the absence of any express agreement to the contrary. the title
to the crops ordinarily vests in the tenant. But where a landlord is about to
lease his land, why may he not contract that the title to the crops raised thereon shall vest in the owner of the soil that produced them? It would seem to
be entirely consonant with reason to so hold, and the authorities pretty uniformly do hold that such stipulations are valid."
"3 Layng v. Stout, 155 Wis. 553, 145 N.W. 227 (1914).
26Klyv. Rummerfield, 117 Wis. 620, 94 N.W. 649 (1903).
"I Brown v. Schwab, 27 Ariz. 457, 233 Pac. 593 (1925).
Is Funk v.Paul, 64 Wis. 35, 24 N.W. 419 (1885) "There would seem to be no
valid reason for terminating the lien as against the mortgagor, merely because
the period of 'suitable nurture' had passed. Such nurture did not give the lien,
and its termination could not take it away as against the mortgagor. As to
such mortgagor the question of notice or insufficiency of description is not
involved, for he had actual notice that such increase was, in fact, covered by
the mortgage. But as to subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees without notice the question is different. As to them, the period of nurture being
passed, and the young being entirely separated from the mother, and not being
mentioned in the mortgage, nor any longer connected with the mother covered by the mortgage, they have neither actual no constructive notice of the
mortgagor's rights and interests, nor anything to put them upon inquiry."
13
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has passed, unless the purchaser has actual or constructive notice that
the young animals are in fact those referred to in the mortgage. How-

ever, if the increase is not mentioned in the mortgage, after the young
have been separated from their mother there is nothing to put the purchasers on inquiry as to the existence of any lien covering the young,
and so such purchasers would not be bound unless they had actual

notice of the mortgage.
The question of the validity of chattel mortgages on stock in trade
and future acquisitions is governed by statute in Wisconsin. Such mortgages are given full effect upon compliance with certain filing requirements." Nevertheless, the lien will be lost, as against creditors and
purchasers, if the mortgagor is authorized to sell for his own benefit,2
or to apply the proceeds wholly or in part to his own use. In an early
case, Blakeslee v. Rossman, the court ruled that "A chattel mortgage
permitting the mortgagor to remain in possession, to sell and apply the
proceeds or any part of them to his own use, is fraudulent and void
in law as against creditors." The fraud is conclusive, and even a taking
of possession by the mortgagee does not purge the fraud, and gives
no valid title as against creditors.
EDMUND
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R. MiETus.

Wis. Stat. (1937) § 241.14. See also 19.MAQ. L. R. 257 (1935)

and 20 MARQ.

L. R. 199 (1936).

Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U.S. 545, 30 Sup. Ct. 412, 54 L.ed. 610

(1910).
2 Wymelenberg v. Badger Furnace Co., 220 Wis. 473, 265 N.W. 718 (1936);
Ross v. State Bank, 198 Wis. 335, 224 N.W. 114 (1929); Morley-Murphy Co.
v. Jodar, 220 Wis. 302, 264 N.W. 926 (1936) ; Franzke v. Hitchon, 105 Wis. 11,
80 N.W. 931 (1900).
22 Blakeslee v. Rossman, 43 Wis. 116 (1877).

